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GENERAL  SHERMAN 

In  the  Last  Tear  of 

THE  CIVIL  WAR 


RARE  WlSltRN  BUUKS 

4227  S.  E.  Stark  St. 
PORTLAND.  ORE. 


General  Sherman  in  the 

Last  Year  of  the 

Civil  War 

An  Address  delivered  at  the 

Thirty-eighth  Reunion  of  the  Society 

of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 

at  St.  Louis,  Missouri 

By 

P.TECUMSEH  SHERMAN 


November  Eleventh 
Nineteen  Hundred  and  Eight 


General  Sherman  in  the 

Last  Year  of  the 

Civil  War 


WITHOUT  pretensions  to  oratory  and  without 
the  ability  to  describe  from  knowledge  ex 
periences  or  campaigns  in  that  great  war, 
whose  memories  it  is  the  object  of  these  reunions  to 
perpetuate,  I  am  at  a  disadvantage  compared  with 
those  who  have  delivered  the  addresses  upon  previous 
occasions.  Thus  handicapped,  I  have  contented 
myself  with  preparing  a  condensed  narrative  of  the 
acts  and  operations  of  my  father,  General  Wm.  Tecum- 
seh  Sherman,  during  the  last  year  of  the  war,  in  which 
I  have  attempted  to  explain  his  opinions  and  motives 
in  the  light  of  tradition  and  of  information  derived 
from  private  or  unpublished  papers.  I  can  present 
little  that  is  new,  perhaps  nothing  new  of  historical 
importance,  yet  I  hope  that  what  I  have  to  present  may 
prove  not  altogether  uninteresting. 

When  in  February,  1864,  General  Grant  was  ap 
pointed  to  the  command  of  all  the  Union  armies  and 
went  East  to  direct  personally  the  operations  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  in  Virginia,  he  left  my  father, 
General  Sherman,  to  succeed  him  in  command  of  the 
Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  which  com 
prised,  roughly,  all  the  territory  between  the  Alleghany 
Mountains,  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Rivers  and  the 
Gulf.  The  number  of  soldiers  borne  on  its  rolls 
mounted  high  into  the  hundreds  of  thousands;  but 
many  of  them  were  sick  or  at  home  on  furlough,  or  were 
recruits  or  trainmen  or  teamsters.  Of  the  remainder 


a  large  part  were  distributed  in  garrisons  along  the 
lines  of  the  Tennessee  and  Mississippi  Rivers  and  of 
the  railroads  South  from  Nashville.  There  remained 
for  offensive  operations  about  100,000  men,  consisting 
of  the  united  Armies  of  the  Tennessee,  the  Cumberland 
and  the  Ohio,  who  were  in  winter  quarters  around 
Chattanooga. 

Genera!  Grant  promptly  formulated  his  plan  for  the 
coming  campaign.  It  provided  for  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  under  Grant  personally,  to  attack  Lee  and 
Richmond;  for  Sherman's  army  to  take  Atlanta, 
keeping  the  opposing  Confederate  army,  however,  as 
his  main  objective  all  the  while;  and  for  Banks'  army, 
then  up  the  Red  River,  to  seize  some  seaport,  either 
Savannah  or  Mobile,  and  move  inland  some  hundred 
miles,  opening  a  railroad  from  the  coast.  Atlanta  being 
taken  and  Banks'  army  pushed  inland  towards  him 
from  the  coast,  my  father  was  then  to  move  out  from 
Atlanta  to  join  Banks,  still  holding  onto  and  extending 
his  railroad,  and  thus  again  divide  and  sever  the  Con 
federacy  by  a  second  line  of  occupation,  as  it  was  al 
ready  divided  farther  West  by  the  occupation  of  the 
line  of  the  Mississippi.  Based  upon  this  new  line  of 
occupation,  with  two  lines  of  supplies,  one  from  Nash 
ville  and  the  North  and  the  other  from  Savannah  or 
Mobile  and  the  sea,  his  army  was  still  to  operate  against 
the  Confederate  forces  of  the  Middle  West. 

In  pursuance  of  this  plan,  in  April,  1864,  Sherman's 
army  moved  out  from  Chattanooga  against  the  Con 
federate  army,  numbering  at  first  about  45,000  but  soon 
reinforced  to  60,000  men,  then  commanded  by  General 
Joseph  E.  Johnston;  and,  after  five  months  of  desper 
ate  and  continuous  fighting  and  a  loss  of  over  30,000 
killed,  wounded  and  missing,  it  captured  Atlanta.  This 
campaign  was  replete  with  technical  military  features, 
which  I  am  incompetent  to  describe,  but  with  which 
many  of  you  are  sufficiently  familiar.  I  can,  however, 
tell  you  a  story  that  gives  some  idea  of  its  character. 


When  I  was  a  small  boy  I  was  generally  told  that  the 
Rebels  under  Johnston,  ran  away.  At  first  I  took  this 
literally;  but  later,  some  doubts  arising  in  my  mind, 
I  asked  my  father  if  they  really  ran  away.  "Yes,"  he 
answered.  "But,"  I  again  inquired,  "did  they  really 
run,  or  did  they  walk?"  "Oh,  that  is  what  you  mean, 
is  it,"  he  replied,  "why,  they  walked,  and  they  walked 
almighty  slow,  too." 

As  the  result  of  this  campaign  not  only  was  Atlanta, 
the  most  important  railroad  center  and  workshop  in 
the  South,  captured;  but  also  in  the  final  struggles  for  it 
the  Confederate  army,  then  under  Hood,  was  badly 
demoralized  and  heavily  reduced  in  numbers;  while 
the  Union  losses  had  been  replenished  by  reenlistments. 
This  was  a  substantial  triumph,  and  wTith  Lincoln's 
reelection,  to  which  it  materially  contributed,  everything 
at  first  glance  seemed  bright  and  promising.  But  in 
reality,  the  future  remained  dark  and  uncertain.  Banks' 
former  army  was  scattered  and  otherwise  engaged, 
and  although  Admiral  Farragut  had  taken  the  forts  of 
Mobile  Bay  there  was  no  Union  army  either  at  Mobile, 
Savannah  or  any  other  convenient  point  on  the  coast, 
strong  enough  to  cooperate  with  General  Sherman 
as  General  Grant  had  planned.  Therefore  he 
abandoned  his  plan  for  a  foreward  movement  from 
Atlanta;  and,  instead,  he  ordered  my  father  to  go 
after  Hood's  army  and  destroy  it.  There  was  little 
doubt  as  to  his  ability  to  destroy  it  if  he  could  catch 
it.  But  could  he  catch  it?  That  was  an  open  question. 
Hood's  army  lay  some  miles  South  of  Atlanta,  and  my 
father  prepared  to  start  after  it.  But  having  gained  in 
mobility  by  its  decrease  in  size,  it  took  the  initiative 
itself,  and — moving  practically  without  baggage  and 
through  a  friendly  and  familiar  country — it  marched 
to  the  northward  right  around  the  Union  army;  and, 
in  spite  of  a  lively  pursuit,  would  have  effected  an 
almost  fatal  lodgment  on  and  destruction  of  the  railway 
that  brought  our  supplies  from  the  North  had  it  not  been 


for  the  heroic  defence  of  the  fort  of  Allatoona.  It  would, 
I  am  sure,  interest  some  of  you  very  much  could  I  read 
you  several  letters  written  by  my  father  to  my  mother 
at  this  time.  They  show  how  extreme  was  his  exas 
peration  caused  by  this  reverse.  He  hopelessly  damned 
his  cavalry;  —  declared  that  it  got  in  the  way  of  his 
infantry.  (This  was,  of  course,  only  an  expression  of 
impatience  and  not  his  deliberate  judgment.)  His 
artillery  and  wagon  trains,  also,  he  characterized  as 
nuisances.  And  the  way  he  wrote  of  some  staff  officers, 
headquarters'  clerks  and  even  generals,  with  their 
heavy  baggage  and  slow  movements,  was,  to  say  the 
least,  far  from  complimentary.  But  his  confidence  in 
his  swift  marching  infantry,  was,  he  declared,  if  pos 
sible,  increased.  He  then  for  the  first  time  expressed 
the  wish  that  he  might  cut  loose  from  his  railroads  and 
trains,  with  four  or  five  pet  infantry  corps.  Then,  he 
predicted,  the  enemy  that  tried  to  march  around  him 
'would  get  into  trouble."  The  same  idea  he  repeated 
several  days  later  in  a  letter  to  General  Grant,  in  which 
he  advocated  the  proposition  that  he  be  allowed  to 
"cut  loose."  "Now,"  he  said,  "Hood  keeps  me  guess 
ing.  Then  I  could  keep  him  guessing."  But  Grant 
still  wished  to  have  Hood  followed.  However,  on  the 
next  move,  Hood  slipped  off  into  the  mountains  of 
Northern  Alabama,  the  winter  rains  set  in,  and  the 
pursuit  became  hopeless.  In  addition  there  arose  the 
further  danger  that,  if  Sherman  should  push  the  pur 
suit  of  Hood  too  far  North,  the  latter  might  double 
back  and  retake  Atlanta,  and  the  results  of  a  whole 
year's  fighting  be  lost.  To  add  to  his  troubles,  "that 
devil  Forrest,"  as  my  father  called  him — using  the 
epithet  in  a  sense  complimentary  to  a  foeman — broke 
through  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and  disputed 
his  hold  on  Western  Tennessee. 

As  has  been  stated,  General  Grant's  original  plan 
for  the  movements  after  the  fall  of  Atlanta  had  contem 
plated  three  conditions :  First — the  aid  and  cooperation 


of  a  strong  Union  army  from  the  coast.  Second — the 
holding  of  Atlanta  and  of  all  of  Tennessee;  and,  Third — 
the  continued  occupation  and  operation  of  the  long  line 
of  railroad  from  Nashville  down  to  Atlanta.  But,  now, 
when  the  time  had  come,  there  was  no  such  army  on 
the  coast.  The  Union  hold  on  Tennessee,  also,  was 
seriously  menaced,  and  to  maintain  it  required  the  use 
of  large  forces  in  scattered  garrisons,  which  were  thereby 
wasted  for  offensive  operations.  And,  finally,  Sher 
man's  hold  upon  the  railroad  to  Atlanta  was  demon 
strated  to  be  too  precarious  to  allow  his  army  to  operate 
safely  from  its  extremity.  That  line  ran  for  250  miles 
through  the  enemy's  country,  where  it  was  continuously 
threatened  and  frequently  broken  by  its  cavalry  and 
guerillas,  and  had  once  barely  escaped  being  seized  at 
a  vital  point — Allatoona — by  Hood's  army  in  force. 
Every  break  in  the  road  meant  on  the  average  a  day's 
delay  in  supplies ;  and  ten  days'  successive  delay  would 
have  reduced  an  army  at  the  front  to  the  verge  of  starva 
tion.  Thus  conditions  forbade  following  out  General 
Grant's  original  plan.  His  modified  plan  required  that 
Hood's  army  be  caught;  but  events  had  shown  that  it 
could  not  be  caught.  The  problem  therefore  had  to  be 
solved  in  some  other  way. 

The  solution  my  father  proposed  was  this:  Instead 
of  holding  Atlanta  and  the  railway  back  to  Nashville 
he  would  abandon  and  destroy  them.  He  would 
abandon  Southern  Tennessee.  Of  the  garrisons  thereby 
released  he  would  create  the  nucleus  of  a  new  army  to 
be  gathered  at  Nashville  under  the  command  of  General 
Thomas;  to  it  he  would  add  the  larger  part  of  his 
artillery  and  cavalry,  two  of  his  corps  of  infantry,  and 
the  bulk  of  the  16th  Corps,  then  returning  under  A.  J. 
Smith  from  the  Red  River.  From  Nashville  North, 
the  railroads  ran  through  a  comparatively  friendly 
country;  its  line  of  supplies  was  therefore  secure. 
About  Nashville,  therefore,  this  force  would  be  free 
from  the  dangers  to  which  an  army  at  Atlanta  or 

7 


Chattanooga  was  exposed,  and  there  it  could  guard 
Kentucky  and  the  North  from  invasion.  If  Hood 
should  venture  into  Tennessee  to  attack  it,  Thomas 
felt  confident  that  he  could,  and  gave  his  promise  that 
he  would  "ruin  him"; — a  promise  which  Thomas 
afterwards  literally  kept.  A  new  army,  strong  enough 
to  take  care  of  the  Western  theater  of  war,  being  thus 
created,  my  father  proposed,  with  the  remainder  of  his 
old  army — with  four  tried  infantry  corps,  numbering 
55,000  men,  and  some  5,000  picked  cavalry — to  march 
to  the  coast — to  Savannah  if  he  could,  if  unforeseen 
obstacles  prevented,  to  Pensacola, — and  to  lay  waste 

on  his  way  so  wide  a  belt  of  country  with  its  railroads 

«/  'iii 

as  to  obtain  temporarily  the  advantages  contemplated 

by  General  Grant's  plan  of  permanent  occupation. 
As  he  expressed  it,  he  would  "thrust  a  rapier  through 
the  vitals  of  the  Confederacy."  He  pointed  out  the 
moral  effect  that  would  result  if  he  were  allowed  "to 
prick  the  bubble,"  and  show  to  the  world  that  the  South 
was  hollow  and  not  a  solid  mass  of  armed  men.  The 
distinctive  feature  of  the  movement  would  be,  that  he 
should  not  hold  or  occupy  railroads  or  places,  but 
instead  should  destroy  them,  and  move  freely,  cutting 
loose  from  his  base  of  supplies  and  "living  off  the 
country."  The  ( fact  that  no  large  army  had  ever  done 
this  successfully  on  the  offensive  in  modern  warfare 
was,  he  argued,  no  reason  why  it  could  not  be  done. 
He  knew  the  country  well,  knew  that  it  could  feed  his 
army  and  that  there  were  no  vital  obstacles  in  the  way. 
If  Hood  should  follow  him,  as  he  rather  expected,  he 
was  confident  that  he  could  turn  on  him  and  beat  him; 
while  if,  on  the  other  hand,  Hood  should  turn  North, 
Thomas  could  beat  him;  in  which  event  my  father's 
army  could  proceed  unopposed  to  the  sea,  establish 
a  new  base,  and  operate  in  the  East  in  aid  of  Grant 
against  Lee. 

When  he  proposed  actually  to  carry  out  this  novel 
plan  General  Grant,  after  some  consideration,  acqui- 

8 


esced;  but  others  to  whom  the  secret  was  confided 
were  aghast.  General  Rawlins  hurried  to  Washington 
to  appeal  to  Mr.  Lincoln  personally  to  veto  the  project. 
There  is  a  tradition  that  Lincoln  yielded,  and  that  a 
telegram  forbidding  the  campaign  was  sent  to  my 
father,  but  that  he  had  anticipated  it  and  cut  the  wire. 
That  is  not  true;  although  the  fact  that  such  a  telegram 
was  contemplated  is  certified  by  the  testimony  of  Gen 
eral  Grant.  The  telegraph  was  used  for  some  days 
longer  for  final  correspondence  with  Thomas.  Finally, 
on  Nov.  12th,  1864,  the  last  train  bearing  its  load  of  sick 
and  wounded  steamed  to  the  North;  the  wire  was  then 
cut  and  the  railroad  broken.  Three  days  later  the 
factories  and  warehouses  of  Atlanta  were  reduced  to 
ashes  and  its  fortifications  dismantled;  and  a  confident 
army  with  a  satisfied  commander  cut  loose  for  the  sea. 
For  thirty-one  days  they  were  lost  to  the  world. 
Rumors  of  disaster,  more  or  less  detailed,  crept  through 
the  Southern  lines  to  the  Northern  papers,  and  kept 
the  North  in  alarmed  suspense.  In  the  Confederacy 
they  caused  overwhelming  consternation  and  confusion. 
Its  entire  system  of  supplies,  communications  and 
military  and  civil  organization  was  severed  and  shat 
tered.  Anxious  messages  of  inquiry  flew  back  and  forth. 
In  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  Records  there  is  a  half 
volume  of  Confederate  despatches  at  this  time,  all  of 
which  may  be  fairly  paraphrased  in  the  single  sentence : 
"  Where  are  we  at  ?"  Wild  proclamations  for  the  people 
to  rise  and  defend  their  homes  emanated  from  all  parts 
of  the  invaded  territory.  A  material  force  was  gathered 
to  stem  the  flood;  but  a  feint  by  the  right  wing  under 
Howard  towards  the  South  caused  the  Georgia  militia 
to  concentrate  at  Macon;  while  another  feint  by  the 
left  wing  under  Slocum  towards  the  East  kept  the  chiv 
alry  of  South  Carolina  in  the  neighborhoods  of  Augusta 
and  Columbia;  and  the  pathway  in  between — to  the 
South  East — to  the  objective  seaport  of  Savannah- 
was  left  clear  and  free.  Down  this  clear  way  swept  the 


invading  army.  On  December  13th  Fort  McAllister, 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Ogeechee  River,  was  stormed  and 
communications  with  the  world  regained.  A  few  days 
later  Savannah  was  occupied,  and  the  March  to  the 
Sea  was  over. 

In  the  traditions  of  the  North  that  march  has  always 
ranked  as  the  romantic  incident  of  the  war.  It  came 
as  a  soft  interlude  between  two  hard  campaigns — 
the  bloody  struggle  for  Atlanta  that  preceded  it,  and 
the  toilsome  winter  march  through  the  Carolinas  that 
followed.  It  was  fraught  with  the  spirit  of  adventure, 
of  plunging  into  the  unknown.  The  only  objective 
the  soldiers  knew  was  the  ocean,  which  the  large 
majority  of  them — inland  born  and  inland  bred — had 
never  seen,  and  which  therefore  they  looked  forward 
to  as  an  object  of  wonder.  The  march  lay  through  a 
land  figuratively  flowing  with  milk  and  honey — in  the 
fragrance  of  the  Georgia  pines — in  the  balmy  air  of  a 
Southern  autumn.  It  was  begun  in  a  golden  Indian 
Summer  morning  of  November  and  ended  at  Christmas- 
tide  with  the  capture  of  the  evergreen  city  of  Savannah, 
which — in  the  romantic  spirit  of  the  whole  march- 
was  offered  as  a  Christmas-gift  to  the  nation. 

As  a  military  achievement  it  has  also  ranked  high. 
While  the  result  was  yet  in  doubt  the  "London  Times"* 
said  of  it: 

"General  Sherman's  movement  will  result  either  in 
the  most  tremendous  disaster  that  ever  befell  an  armed 
host,  or  it  will  be  written  on  the  pages  of  history  as  the 
very  consummation  of  the  success  of  sublime  audacity. 
The  name  of  the  captor  of  Atlanta,  if  he  fail  now,  will 
become  the  scoff  of  mankind  and  the  humiliation  of  the 
United  States  for  all  time.  If  he  succeed  it  will  be 
written  upon  the  tablet  of  fame  side  by  side  with  that  of 
Napoleon  and  Hannibal.  He  will  either  be  a  Xerxes  or 
a  Xenophon." 

*  I  have  not  been  able  to  verify  the  source  of  this  quotation.    In  "  Townsend's  Library" 
it  is  ascribed  to  the  "London  Herald"  (?). 

10 


But  my  father  always  thought  that  this  campaign  was 
overrated  in  comparison  with  those  that  preceded  and 
followed  it,  and  believed  its  audacity  exaggerated.  He 
considered  it  primarily  only  as  a  change  of  base,  whereby 
he  transferred  60,000  trained  veterans,  superfluous  in 
the  West,  to  a  new  base  on  the  coast,  whence  they  could 
operate  more  effectively  in' the  East. 

Upon  arriving  at  Savannah,  General  Sherman  found 
despatches  from  General  Grant  ordering  him  to  bring 
his  army  by  sea  to  Virginia,  there  to  join  directly  in  the 
campaign  against  Richmond.  To  this  he  demurred; 
and  urged  instead,  that  he  be  allowed  to  march  overland 
against  Lee's  rear,  so  as  to  destroy  the  Confederate 
railroads,  arsenals  and  supplies  on  the  way.  General 
Grant  immediately  and  cordially  approved  of  this 
suggestion. 

'  Your  confidence,"  he  wrote,  "in  being  able  to  march 
up  and  join  this  army  pleases  me,  and  I  believe  it  can  be 
done.  The  effect  of  such  a  campaign  will  be  to  disorgan 
ize  the  South,  and  to  prevent  the  organization  of  new 
armies  from  their  broken  fragments.  Hood  is  now 
retreating,  with  his  army  broken  and  demoralized. 
#  *  *  *  jf  time  is  given,  the  fragments  may  be 
collected  together,  and  many  of  the  deserters  reassembled. 
If  we  can,  we  should  act  to  prevent  this.  Your  spare 
army,  as  it  were,  moving  as  proposed,  will  do  it." 

Floods  in  the  Savannah  River  delayed  the  start  until 
February  1st,  1865.  Then  began  a  march — through 
an  enemy's  country  and  without  a  base  of  supply — that 
for  distance  and  difficulties  surmounted  has  never  been 
surpassed,  unless  by  the  armies  of  Xenophon  and 
Hannibal.  The  final  objective  was  Lee's  army  in 
Virginia.  The  intermediate  objective  was  Goldsboro, 
North  Carolina,  where  communications  with  the  sea 
were  to  be  regained  and  reinforcements  expected.  That 
point  was  425  miles  from  Savannah;  and  the  route 
between  lay  through  a  country  largely  in  the  state  of 
nature,  over  narrow  mud  roads,  through  wild  forests 

11 


andf  innumerable  swamps,  and  across  five  large  navi 
gable  rivers.  It  was  in  midwinter,  under  heavy  rains, 
and  nearly  every  mile  of  the  road  had  to  be  corduroyed. 
The  soldiers  marched  in  deep  mud — sometimes  up 
to  their  waists  in  water — and  loaded  with  heavy  baggage 
and  rations;  often  after  the  day's  march  many  hours 
had  to  be  spent  in  corduroying  and  in  assisting  the 
trains;  and  at  nights  they  had  to  camp  in  wet  and  mire. 
Food  also  was  scarce  and  poor.  There  are,  therefore, 
few  pleasant  traditions  of  this  march  to  perpetuate  its 
story  along  with  that  of  the  march  from  Atlanta  to 
Savannah.  Moreover,  a  determined  although  inferior 
enemy  encircled  the  invading  host,  and  was  rapidly 
accumulating  in  its  front.  At  the  start,  Columbia, 
South  Carolina,  had  been  gained  without  serious 
opposition,  because  feints  in  false  directions  had  kept 
the  enemy  deceived  and  divided.  But  after  the  fall 
of  Columbia  the  Confederates  from  Charleston  and 
Augusta  hastened  to  unite  in  its  front,  the  organized 
remnants  of  Hood's  army  were  hurried  over  the  moun 
tains  to  reinforce  them,  and  Lee  made  some  small 
detachments  to  strengthen  their  numbers.  And  the 
redoubted  Johnston,  a  leader  whom  no  feints  could 
deceive,  was  sent  to  command  them.  General  Sherman 
therefore  had  reason  to  experience  an  anxiety  unfelt 
during  the  march  through  Georgia.  And  there  was  one 
danger  that  he  particularly  feared — a  risk  that  he  had 
weighed  in  advance,  and  exposure  to  which  made  this 
movement  essentially  daring  —  which  was,  that  Lee 
might  break  away  from  Grant,  combine  with  Johnston, 
and  overwhelm  him  in  the  wilderness,  far  away  from 
any  base  of  supplies  and  without  ambulances  or  other 
provision  for  his  wounded.  He  therefore  pressed 
anxiously  and  rapidly  on  to  Goldsboro;  but  not  so 
hurriedly  as  to  neglect  his  purpose  of  destroying  all 
railroads  and  military  supplies  on  the  way.  Columbia, 
Cheraw  and  Fayetteville,  with  their  depots  and  arsenals, 
were  taken,  and  the  last  great  river  crossed,  without 

12 


difficulty.  *  Then  the  crisis  came  as  they  were  approach 
ing  Goldsboro.  Supplies  were  low,  the  army  was  encum 
bered  with  many  refugees,  and — while  almost  entirely 
free  from  sickness — was  without  means  of  caring  for 
its  wounded  in  case  of  battle.  When  it  should  reach 
Goldsboro,  all  would  be  changed.  At  two  points  nearby 
on  the  coast  were  supplies  and  reinforcements.  At 
Newbern  was  Schofield  with  the  old  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
fresh  from  its  victories  at  Franklin  and  Nashville.  At 
Wilmington  was  Terry,with  the  captors  of  Fort  Fisher. 
Once  at  Goldsboro  therefore,  my  father's  army  would 
unite  with  these  forces,  be  properly  supplied  and  be 
well  based  upon  the  coast.  Therefore,  to  prevent  this 
junction,  Johnston — at  the  last  moment — struck  dar 
ingly  and  desperately  at  the  flank  of  the  advancing 
columns,  at  Averysboro  and  Bentonville.  But  he  was 
brushed  aside;  and  on  March  22nd  Goldsboro  was 
reached,  the  desired  junction  effected,  and  communica 
tions  with  the  world  again  regained. 

My  father  always  rated  this  campaign  as  his  greatest 
military  achievement,  and  believed  that  it  settled  the 
fate  of  the  Confederacy.  Not  only  had  he  by  this 
march  wiped  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas  off  the  map  as 
sources  of  supplies  and  reinforcements  for  Lee;  but 
by  his  junction  with  Schofield  and  Terry  at  Goldsboro, 
he  had  secured  his  army  from  any  material  danger  from 
a  combined  attack  of  Lee  and  Johnston,  and  had  placed 
it  where  it  and  Grant's  army  between  them  held  the 
last  two  Eastern  armies  of  the  Confederacy  figuratively 
"between  a  thumb  and  forefinger."  That  Lee  had 
made  no  effort  to  combine  with  Johnston  to  attack  him 
before  he  reached  Goldsboro,  was,  in  his  opinion,  a 
serious  strategic  error.  On  this  subject  General  Lee 
wrote,  after  the  war: 

"As  regards  the  movements  of  General  Sherman,  it 
was  easy  to  see  that,  unless  they  were  interrupted,  I 
should  be  compelled  to  abandon  the  defense  of  Rich 
mond,  and  with  a  view  of  arresting  his  progress  I  so 

13 


weakened  my  force  by  sending  reinforcements  to  South 
and  North  Carolina,  that  I  had  not  sufficient  men  to 
man  my  lines.  Had  they  not  been  broken  I  should  have 
abandoned  them  as  soon  as  General  Sherman  reached 
the  Roanoke." 

In  my  father's  opinion,  Lee  waited  too  long  in  Rich 
mond,  and  according  to  this  letter  planned  to  wait 
longer.  Johnston  alone  had  done  the  best  possible 
at  the  critical  moment.  Therefore,  although  holding 
Lee's  tactical  abilities  in  high  estimation,  he  regarded 
Johnston  as  the  abler  strategist. 

Leaving  his  army  at  Goldsboro,  with  General  Scho- 
field  in  charge,  my  father  then  made  a  hurried  trip  by 
sea  to  City  Point,  Virginia,  to  confer  with  General 
Grant.  While  there  he  had  two  long  interviews  with 
President  Lincoln,  at  the  more  important  of  which 
General  Grant  and  Admiral  Porter  were  present. 
Mr.  Lincoln  first  expressed  anxiety  about  the  safety 
of  my  father's  army  in  his  absence  ;  but  was  quickly 
reassured  on  that  point.  He  then  expressed  his  extreme 
desire  that  the  war  might  be  terminated  without  further 
bloodshed;  and  stated  that  he  was  willing  to  make  the 
greatest  possible  concessions  to  that  end,  and  that  he 
was  all  ready  in  his  mind  for  the  civil  reorganization 
of  affairs  in  the  South  as  soon  as  the  war  should  cease. 
According  to  my  father's  understanding — confirmed 
by  Admiral  Porter's  recollection  and  notes  of  the  con 
versation — Mr.  Lincoln  then  distinctly  authorized  him 
to  assure  the  people  of  North  Carolina  that,  as  soon  as 
the  rebel  armies  should  lay  down  their  arms,  they  would 
at  once  be  guaranteed  all  their  rights  as  citizens  of  a 
common  country,  and  that,  to  avoid  anarchy,  the  state 
governments  then  in  existence,  with  their  civil  func 
tionaries,  would  be  recognized  by  him  as  the  govern 
ments  de  facto  till  Congress  could  provide  others.  To 
my  father's  enquiry  —  should  he  let  Davis  and  other 
political  leaders  escape  ? — Mr.  Lincoln  replied  indirectly 
by  telling  the  story  of  the  teetotaler,  who,  being  invited 

14 


to  have  some  brandy  in  his  lemonade,  declined;  but 
added,  that  if  a  little  could  be  put  in  "unbeknownst" 
to  him  he  would  not  object. 

With  this  understanding  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  wishes, 
my  father  returned  to  his  army  in  North  Carolina. 
That  he  had  misunderstood  and  that  Mr.  Lincoln  had 
not  intended  that  any  assurances  as  to  civil  rights  should 
be  included  in  a  military  convention  is  generally  inferred 
from  the  following  despatch  that  Mr.  Lincoln  had 
caused  to  be  sent  to  General  Grant^some  three  weeks 
previously:  "Washington,  March  3d,  1865. 

"Lieutenant  General  Grant, 

"The  President  directs  me  to  say  that  he  wishes  you 
to  have  no  conference  with  General  Lee,  unless  it  be  for 
the  capitulation  of  General  Lee's  army,  or  on  some 
minor  or  purely  military  matter.  He  instructs  me  to 
say  that  you  are  not  to  decide,  discuss  or  confer  upon 
any  political  questions.  Such  questions  the  President 
holds  in  his  own  hands,  and  will  submit  them  to  no 
military  conferences  or  conventions. 

*********** 

"EowiN  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War." 

But  of  this  despatch  Gen.  Sherman  had  no  knowl 
edge  or  information,  and  it  was  not  referred  to  in  his 
conversation  with  Mr.  Lincoln.  And  the  approval  a  few 
days  after  that  conversation  by  the  Union  commander 
in  Richmond,  of  a  call  for  a  meeting  of  the  existing  pro- 
Confederate  legislature  of  Virginia,  coming  promptly 
to  Gen.  Sherman's  knowledge,  confirmed  his  under 
standing  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  instructions. 

Events  now  moved  rapidly.    On  April  10th  my  father 
again  started  his  army  against  his  opponent,  Johnston; 
on  the  llth  he  received  news  of  the  surrender  of  Lee; 
on  the  14th  he  received  overtures  for  surrender  from 
Johnston;   and  on  the  17th  met  him  under  flag  of  truce 
at  Durham  Station,  North  Carolina.     It  was  when  on 
the  point  of  starting  to  this  meeting  that  he  received  the 


15 


news  of  the  assassination  of  Lincoln.  He  first  offered 
General  Johnston  the  terms  that  General  Grant  had 
given  General  Lee;  but  Johnston  pleaded  for  terms 
for  all  the  Confederate  armies.  General  Sherman 
answered  that  he  had  no  authority  to  make  any  such 
arrangement.  But  at  a  second  conference  the  next  day, 
after  consulting  with  his  immediate  subordinates,  he 
wrote  out  terms  to  cover  all  the  Southern  armies,  which 
he  offered  to  submit  to  President  Johnson  for  consid 
eration,  the  two  armies  to  maintain  a  truce  in  the  mean 
time. 

Those  terms  were,  in  brief: 

The  Confederate  armies  to  disband  and  deposit  their 
arms  in  the  state  arsenals,  to  be  disposed  of  as  Congress 
might  provide. 

The  recognition  by  the  President,  of  the  state  govern 
ments,  and  of  their  officers,  etc.,  upon  their  taking  the 
oath  of  allegiance;  where  conflicting  governments 
existed,  their  legitimacy  to  be  determined  by  the 
Federal  courts. 

The  people  and  inhabitants  of  the  states  to  be  guar 
anteed,  so  far  as  the  Executive  could,  their  political 
rights  and  franchises,  as  well  as  their  rights  of  person 
and  property. 

The  Executive  authority  of  the  government  not  to 
disturb  any  of  the  people  by  reason  of  the  war,  so  long 
as  they  lived  in  peace  and  quiet,  abstained  from  acts  of 
hostility,  and  obeyed  the  laws. 

In  general  terms,  the  war  to  cease,  and,  so  far  as  the 
Executive  could  assure  it,  a  general  amnesty. 

These  terms  were  promptly  agreed  to  and  signed,  and 
a  copy  sent  to  the  authorities  at  Washington  for  such 
action  thereon  as  they  might  see  fit.  General  Sherman 
did  not  assume  that,  as  a  matter  of  course,  they  would 
be  approved  in  substance;  much  less  that  they  would 
be  literally  approved.  On  the  contrary,  the  next  day 
he  wrote  General  Johnston,  that  they  would  doubtless 
have  to  be  amended  to  contain  an  explicit  admission 

16 


of  the  validity  of  emancipation.  Therefore  he  was 
neither  surprised  nor  greatly  disappointed  when  they 
were  disapproved;  in  fact,  General  Grant,  when  he 

i'oined  General  Sherman  soon  after  the  receipt  by  the 
atter  of  the  official  notification  of  their  rejection,  re 
ported  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  that  General  Sherman 
*  was  not  surprised,  but  rather  expected  their  rejection." 
But  he  was  astonished  and  mortified  by  the  storm  of 
indignation  with  which  they  were  received  in  the  North. 
He  had  not  realized  the  change  in  public  sentiment 
caused  by  the  assassination  of  President  Lincoln,  nor 
the  state  of  panic  and  confusion — amounting  almost 
to  hysteria — to  which  official  Washington  had  been 
reduced  by  it.  And  he  resented  bitterly  and  openly  the 
public  announcements  and  orders  then  made  by  Gen 
eral  Halleck  and  Secretary  Stanton,  in  which  his  sub 
ordination  and  loyalty  were  questioned  and  his  motives 
impugned.  His  feelings  were  best  expressed  in  a  letter 
to  General  Grant:  "My  opinions,"  he  wrote,  "on  all 
matters  are  very  strong,  but  if  I  am  possessed  properly 
of  the  views  and  orders  of  my  superiors  I  make  them 
my  study  and  conform  my  conduct  to  them  as  if  they 
were  my  own.  The  President  has  only  to  tell  me  what 
he  wants  done,  and  I  will  do  it.  I  was  hurt,  outraged 
and  insulted  at  Mr.  Stanton's  public  arraignment  of 
my  motives  and  actions,  at  his  endorsing  General 
Halleck's  insulting  and  offensive  despatch,  and  his 
studied  silence  when  the  press  accused  me  of  all  sorts 
of  base  motives,  even  of  selling  myself  to  Jeff  Davis  for 
gold,  of  sheltering  criminals  and  entertaining  ambitious 
views  at  the  expense  of  my  country."  But  denuncia 
tion  on  the  one  side  and  bitterness  on  the  other  subsided 
after  a  time.  General  Grant,  who  was  ordered  to 
North  Carolina  to  supersede  General  Sherman,  acted 
with  his'  characteristic  magnanimity  and  tact ;  and  the 
incident  was  closed  by  Sherman's  receiving  the  sur 
render  of  Johnston  on  the  identical  terms  that  had  been 
granted  to  Lee. 

17 


F*  The  course  of  reconstruction  in  the  bitter  political 
years  that  followed  was  altogether  contrary  to  the  terms 
of  the  original  convention  between  Generals  Sherman 
and  Johnston.  Military  governments  were  established 
in  the  South,  the  Confederate  soldiers  were  temporarily 
disfranchised  and  the  negroes  en  masse  enfranchised; 
while  those  terms  would  have  recognized  the  civil 
governments  of  the  Southern  states,  enfranchised  the 
Confederate  soldiers  immediately,  and  left  the  negroes 
disfranchised.  For  a  generation,  therefore,  the  popular 
verdict  of  the  North  and  of  history  has  been  altogether 
against  that  convention.  And  almost  equally  general 
has  been  the  verdict  that  its  terms  could  not  have 
represented  the  policy  of  Abraham  Lincoln.  But 
Admiral  Porter,  who  was  an  attentive  listener  at  and 
who  kept  notes  of  the  final  interview  between  President 
Lincoln  and  General  Sherman,  subsequently  wrote: 

"The  terms  of  the  convention  between  him  and 
Johnston  were  exactly  in  accordance  with  Mr.  Lincoln's 
wishes.  He  [Sherman]  could  not  have  done  anything 
that  would  have  pleased  Mr.  Lincoln  better." 

And  General  Sherman,  although  less  positive  as  to 
the  correctness  of  his  construction  of  Lincoln's  verbal 
instructions,  yet  always  firmly  believed  that  the  sub 
stance  of  those  terms  expressed  the  policy  of  recon 
struction  outlined  by  Mr.  Lincoln  in  their  interview, 
and  w^hich  Mr.  Lincoln  would  have  followed,  had  he 
lived.  And  he  always  believed  that  that  policy  would 
have  been  the  wisest  and  best;  and  that  the  course 
reconstruction  actually  followed  was  a  continuing  series 
of  mistakes  on  both  sides,  for  which  Mr.  Lincoln's 
untimely  death  was  responsible. 

In  his  antagonism  to  secession  General  Sherman 
was  radical.  He  held  that  it  was  rebellion — treason— 
which  justified  the  harshest  measures  of  war  for  its 
repression.  But  when  war  ceased  he  believed  that 
punitive  measures,  with  some  possible  exceptions, 
should  also  cease.  And  particularly  towards  the  Con- 
is 


federate  soldiers  he  believed  in  a  conciliatory  policy. 
He  regarded  them  as  the  strongest  and  at  the  same  time 
the  least  embittered  element  in  the  South.  He  believed, 
that  having  fought  the  war  to  a  finish  fairly,  they  were 
prepared  to  accept  its  results,  and  would  not  be  disposed 
to  thwart  the  North  in  attaining  what  it  fought  for. 
Therefore  he  thought  that  to  them  in  large  measure 
should  be  committed  the  task  of  restoring  order  and 
good  government.  Their  disfranchisement,  even  for 
a  short  time,  seemed  to  him  a  useless  humiliation  and 
an  incentive  to  sectional  hatred  and  hostility. 

On  the  negro  question  he  occupied  neutral  ground, 
midway  between  extreme  opinions.  He  was  not 
intensely  hostile  to  slavery;  but  he  believed  in  the 
ultimate  right  and  economic  superiority  of  freedom. 
He  respected  the  negro  race;  and  often  used  to  describe 
instances  that  he  had  met  of  the  highest  intelligence 
and  of  the  strongest  sense  of  honor  among  negroes. 
And  he  admired  their  splendid  record  during  the  war. 
Therefore,  although  he  had  dwelt  long  and  intimately 
in  the  slave  states,  he  had  no  sympathy  then  and  would 
have  no  sympathy  now  with  the  sectional  contention 
that  the  negroes  are  all  too  hopelessly  inferior  to  be 
admitted  in  any  way,  to  any  extent  and  at  any  time  to 
equal  rights  with  white  men.  But  he  did  not  believe 
that  they  should  be  enfranchised  in  mass  at  the  end  of 
the  war.  He  never  sympathized  with  the  theory  that 
the  ballot  is  a  means  of  education,  to  be  given  to  chil 
dren  to  teeth  on.  He  regarded  it  rather  as  a  power  and 
a  privilege  to  be  won  step  by  step  after  years  of  effort; 
and  its  exercise  as  a  duty  and  a  burden,  which  the 
negroes  as  a  whole  were  not  prepared  and  fitted  to 
assume.  Therefore  he  believed  that  its  imposition 
upon  the  negroes,  so  soon,  was  not  only  unjust  to  their 
white  neighbors  but  more  unjust  to  them.  "I  never 
heard  a  negro,"  he  wrote,  "ask  for  that,  and  it  would 
be  his  ruin.  I  believe  it  would  result  in  riots  and 
violence  at  all  the  polls."  "  I  prefer  to  give  votes  to  rebel 

19 


whites,  now  humbled,  subdued  and  obedient,  rather 
than  to  ignorant  blacks,  who  are  not  yet  capable  of 
self  government."  And  believing  as  he  did  that  the 
Confederate  soldiers  as  a  class  acquiesced  in  emancipa 
tion  and  then  felt  kindly  towards  the  negroes,  General 
Sherman  thought  that  they  would  accord  to  the  negroes 
all  essential  rights,  and  that  without  universal  suffrage 
comparative  harmony  would  exist  between  the  two 
races. 

But  these  questions  did  not  arise  and  these  opinions 
were  not  expressed  until  after  the  convention  with 
Johnston.  At  that  time  the  idea  of  negro  suffrage  and 
of  military  governments  for  the  Southern  states  after 
rebellion  had  ceased  had  never  occurred  to  or  been 
heard  of  by  General  Sherman.  Therefore  when  he 
framed  the  rejected  terms  with  Johnston  he  was  not 
betraying  the  known  wishes  of  the  government  or  of 
the  Northern  people  in  favor  of  ideas  of  his  own;  but 
was  actuated  by  the  sole  and  only  motive  of  carrying 
out  the  wishes  and  instructions  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  as 
he  understood  them. 

Reverting  for  a  moment  to  military  movements: 
From  Raleigh,  North  Carolina,  where  peace  found 
it,  General  Sherman  led  his  army  its  last  march,  which 
terminated  in  the  "Grand  Review"  at  Washington. 

Of  that  army,  that  had  fought  its  way  in  triumph 
through  the  four  quarters  of  the  Confederacy,  permit 
me,  in  conclusion,  to  add  a  few  words.  I  remember  as 
a  boy  seeing  in  the  museum  of  one  of  the  United  States 
arsenals  an  old  army  wagon  that  had  painted  on  its 
body  the  legend  of  its  travels.  As  well  as  1  can  recollect, 
it  started  from  Cairo,  Illinois,  went  first  to  Shiloh,  thence 
to  Corinth  and  Memphis,  thence  South  to  the  Tallahat- 
chie  River  and  back  to  Memphis,  thence  down  to 
Vicksburg  and  Jackson  and  again  back  to  Memphis, 
thence  East  to  Chattanooga,  on  to  Knoxville  and  back 
to  Chattanooga,  thence  South  from  depot  to  depot 
that  marked  the  steps  on  the  weary  way  to  Atlanta, 

20 


thence  North  to  Huntsville,  Alabama,  and  back  South 
again  to  Atlanta,  thence  on  to  Milledgeville  and  Sav 
annah,  Georgia,  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  Fayette- 
ville  and  Goldsboro,  North  Carolina,  and  Alexandria 
in  Northern  Virginia.  In  its  essential  parts  that  wagon 
was  still  solid,  but  it  was  so  battered  and  bruised  as 
obviously  to  have  endured  so  much  as  to  deserve  place 
in  a  museum.  And  I  reflected,  as  I  looked  at  it,  that 
there  were  thousands  of  men  who  had  made  that  same 
journey  or  its  equivalent  on  foot,  and  had  in  addition 
fought  and  labored  on  the  way,  who  were  stronger, 
therefore,  than  oak  and  iron — of  which  that  wagon 
was  constructed; — and  that  of  such  men,  almost 
wholly,  was  composed  the  army  that  swept  from 
Chattanooga  to  Goldsboro.  I  then  comprehended  a 
strong  conviction  held  by  my  father,  that  had  a  con 
trolling  influence  on  many  of  his  operations  that  I  have 
attempted  to  describe;  which  was,  his  supreme  confi 
dence  in  the  ability  of  his  army,  due  to  his  lofty  estimate 
of  the  material  of  which  it  was  composed.  That  he  had 
been  deemed  worthy  to  command  such  an  army  and 
had  won  its  confidence,  was  to  him — far  beyond  his 
strategic  achievements — the  source  of  his  greatest 
pride  and  highest  satisfaction. 


21 


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